Economic Growth

Lecture 9: Endogenous growth, part one

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Endogenous Growth

- Models so far have little to say about origins of sustained growth or determinants of cross-country productivity differences.
- We will soon turn to models where improvements in productivity are the result of deliberate investments in R&D-like activities.
- Requires departing from perfect competition.
- But sustained growth is still possible with perfect competition
 - -Ak models
 - Ak models 'in disguise' [linear accumulation technology, e.g., Rebelo 1991]
 - Ak models 'in equilibrium' [externalities in physical or human capital accumulation, e.g., Romer 1986, Lucas 1988]

1. One-sector Ak model

Setup Equilibrium dynamics Policy effects

- 2. Two-sector Ak model Setup Balanced growth path
- **3. Growth with externalities** Externalities in capital accumulation Planning problem

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Policy effects

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Representative Household

- Representative household of size L(t) growing at rate n.
- Consumption per worker $c(t) \equiv C(t)/L(t)$.
- Balanced growth preferences, inelastic labor supply

$$U = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left(\frac{c(t)^{1-\theta} - 1}{1-\theta}\right) e^{nt} dt$$

• Flow budget constraint in terms of net assets per worker

$$\dot{a}(t) = (r(t) - n)a(t) + w(t) - c(t)$$

• No-ponzi game constraint in terms of net assets per worker

$$\lim_{T \to \infty} \exp\left(-\int_0^T (r(s) - n) \, ds\right) a(T) \ge 0$$

Representative Household

• Consumption Euler equation

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = \frac{r(t) - \rho}{\theta}$$

• Transversality condition

$$\lim_{T \to \infty} \exp\left(-\int_0^T (r(s) - n) \, ds\right) a(T) = 0$$

Representative Firm

• Production function in terms of capital per worker

$$y(t) = f(k(t)) = Ak(t), \qquad A > 0$$

• Factor prices

$$R(t) = A$$
$$w(t) = 0$$

• Hence real interest rate

$$r(t) = R(t) - \delta = A - \delta$$

• REMARKS. Key is not the absence of diminishing returns, but rather that the Inada conditions are not satisfied. In particular, that $f'(\infty) = A > 0$.

The two-sector Ak model we turn to next will restore the role of labor in production and so will have w(t) > 0.

Competitive Equilibrium

- A *competitive equilibrium* is a system of prices and quantities such that:
 - (i) the representative household maximizes utility, taking prices as given
 - (ii) the representative firm maximizes profits, taking prices as given
 - (iii) markets clear, in particular

$$a(t) = k(t)$$

- The competitive equilibrium here is efficient. Finding a competitive equilibrium equivalent to solving planning problem.
- Key equilibrium conditions reduce to

$$\dot{k}(t) = (A - \delta - n)k(t) - c(t)$$
$$\dot{c}(t) = \frac{A - \delta - \rho}{\theta}c(t)$$

plus the transversality condition

$$\lim_{T \to \infty} \exp\left(-(A - \delta - n)T\right)k(T) = 0$$

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- To simplify notation, let $g \equiv (A \delta \rho)/\theta$ and let $r \equiv A \delta$.
- System can be written

$$\dot{k}(t) = (r - n)k(t) - c(t), \qquad \dot{c}(t) = gc(t)$$

- Growth in consumption per worker is constant g, independent of the level of capital per worker.
- Growth in capital per worker is constant if c(t)/k(t) ratio is constant, in which case k(t) must also be growing at rate g.
- Let's verify this is indeed the solution by solving the dynamics exactly.

• System can be written

$$\dot{k}(t) = (r-n)k(t) - c(t), \qquad \dot{c}(t) = gc(t)$$

• Implies a second-order differential equation in k(t), namely

$$\ddot{k}(t) = (r-n+g)\dot{k}(t) - (r-n)gk(t)$$

- Look for solutions of the form $k(t) = e^{\lambda t} k(0)$ for some λ to be determined.
- Roots λ must satisfy the characteristic polynomial

$$\lambda^2 - (r - n + g)\lambda + (r - n)g = 0$$

so roots are

$$\lambda_1 = r - n, \qquad \lambda_2 = g$$

• Both may be positive. How do we know which root to pick?

• Suppose we take $\lambda_1 = r - n$. Then $\dot{k}(t) = (r - n)k(t)$ and from the resource constraint we would have

$$c(t) = (r - n)k(t) - \dot{k}(t) = 0$$

- We can do better than this [also violates the transversality condition].
- Suggests we should choose $\lambda_2 = g$. Then $\dot{k}(t) = gk(t)$ and from the resource constraint we would have

$$c(t) = (r - n)k(t) - \dot{k}(t) = (r - n - g)k(t)$$

• To satisfy the transversality condition we need

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} e^{-(r-n)t} e^{gt} k(0) = 0 \qquad \Leftrightarrow \qquad r-n > g$$

• REMARK. So here transversality condition is satisfied iff the policy function c = (r - n - g)k is increasing in k.

• ASSUMPTIONS. To streamline the exposition, suppose

(i) $A > \rho + \delta$, so economy is growing, g > 0(ii) $\rho > (1 - \theta)(A - \delta) + \theta n$, so TVC is satisfied, r - n > g

• Then we can say

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = \frac{\dot{k}(t)}{k(t)} = g > 0$$


with initial consumption given by policy function c(0) = (r - n - g)k(0).

- No transitional dynamics, economy immediately on balanced growth path.
- Growth is sustained and endogenous

$$g = \frac{A - \delta - \rho}{\theta}$$

Higher ρ reduces the growth rate, higher intertemporal elasticity of substitution $1/\theta$ increases the growth rate, etc.

Phase Diagram



capital, k

Saving Rate

• Saving rate is given by

$$s(t) \equiv \frac{I(t)}{Y(t)} = \frac{\dot{K}(t) + \delta K(t)}{Y(t)} = \left(\frac{\dot{K}(t)}{K(t)} + \delta\right) \frac{K(t)}{Y(t)} = \frac{g + n + \delta}{A}$$

so on substituting for g

$$s(t) = \frac{A - \delta - \rho + \theta(n + \delta)}{A\theta} \equiv s \in (0, 1),$$
 for all t

- Constant saving rate s, as in basic Solow model, but now endogenous to structural parameters $A, \delta, \rho, \theta, n$.
- REMARK. (i) g > 0 ensures s > 0, (ii) r n > g ensures s < 1.

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Policy Effects

- Competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
- To illustrate policy effects, consider distortionary tax $\tau \in (0, 1)$ on return on net assets so that

$$\dot{a}(t) = ((1 - \tau)r(t) - n)a(t) + w(t) - c(t)$$

• From consumption Euler equation, growth rate is now

$$g = \frac{(1-\tau)(A-\delta) - \rho}{\theta}$$

and saving rate is now

$$s = \frac{(1-\tau)(A-\delta) - \rho + \theta(n+\delta)}{A\theta}$$

• Both growth rate g and saving rate s are decreasing in τ whenever $A > \delta$.

Policy Effects

- Saving rate is now endogenous to policy τ .
- Since saving rate is constant, differences in policy τ will lead to *permanent* differences not just in levels but also in growth rates.
- Hence even smaller differences in τ can have very large effects.
- Consider two economies identical except one has tax τ and the other τ' .

• For any
$$\tau' > \tau$$

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} \frac{Y(t; \tau')}{Y(t; \tau)} = 0$$

Policy Effects: Discussion

- So in principle Ak model can generate arbitrarily large differences in output per worker across countries.
- Given that, why not make Ak model the benchmark, rather than standard neoclassical model? Two key problems:
 - (i) Ak model implies capital share of income $\rightarrow 1$, no labor demand
 - (ii) Ak model implies too much instability in the cross-country distribution of income, predicts large amounts of churn based on policy variation as opposed to relatively stable distribution we observe

in other words, Ak model implies too much sensitivity to policy

- As we will see, the former problem is relatively straightforward to address.
- The latter problem is more fundamental.

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Two-Sector Ak Model

- Key implications of Ak model *not* driven by output linear in capital.
- Instead, key is that the *accumulation technology* is linear.
- Rebelo (1991) is a clean example, consumption good sector and investment good sector with linear accumulation of investment goods.
- Representative household with balanced growth preferences.
- Constant labor force L > 0 with n = 0 [this is not important].

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Two-Sector Ak Model

• Consumption Goods Sector. Uses the production function

$$C(t) = BK_C(t)^{\alpha} L_C(t)^{1-\alpha}, \qquad 0 < \alpha < 1, \qquad B > 0$$

• Investment Goods Sector. Uses the production function

$$I(t) = AK_I(t), \qquad A > 0$$

- Investment goods sector more capital intensive than rest of the economy.
- Capital accumulation is then

$$\dot{K}(t) = I(t) - \delta K(t)$$

Market Clearing

• Labor is only used to make consumption goods

$$L_C(t) = L$$

• Capital is used in both sectors

$$K_C(t) + K_I(t) = K(t)$$

- Equilibrium has to pin down allocation of capital between sectors.
- Let $x(t) \equiv K_I(t)/K(t)$ denote share of capital used to make investment.
- Let $p_I(t)$, $p_C(t)$ denote prices of investment and consumption goods (we will make consumption goods the numeraire, but not yet).
- Relative price will adjust endogenously.

Consumption Euler Equation

- Let $r_C(t)$ denote the real return in units of consumption goods.
- Let $r_I(t)$ denote the real return in units of investment goods.
- These returns are linked by no-arbitrage arguments

$$\frac{r_C(t)}{p_C(t)} + \frac{\dot{p}_C(t)}{p_C(t)} = \frac{r_I(t)}{p_I(t)} + \frac{\dot{p}_I(t)}{p_I(t)}$$

• As in one-sector model, $r_C(t)$ satisfies consumption Euler equation

$$g_C(t) \equiv \frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = \frac{r_C(t) - \rho}{\theta}$$

- As in one-sector model, $r_I(t)/p_I(t) = A \delta$, constant.
- But what determines change in relative prices linking these returns?

Allocation of Capital Between Sectors

• Marginal revenue product of capital in investment sector

$p_I(t)A$

• Marginal revenue product of capital in consumption sector

$$p_C(t)\alpha B\Big(\underbrace{(1-x(t))K(t)}_{=K_C(t)}\Big)^{\alpha-1}L^{1-\alpha}$$

• So, in equilibrium, relative price will satisfy

$$\frac{p_I(t)}{p_C(t)} = \left((1 - x(t))K(t)\right)^{\alpha - 1} \times \left(\frac{\alpha B L^{1 - \alpha}}{A}\right)$$

• Share of capital x(t) in investment sector increasing in $p_I(t)/p_C(t)$.

Labor Demand and Wages

- Labor is used in the consumption sector.
- Perfect competition in goods and factor markets so

$$w(t) = p_C(t)(1 - \alpha)B((1 - x(t))K(t))^{\alpha}L^{-\alpha}$$

- A competitive equilibrium is then defined in the usual way.
- As in basic Ak model, there are no transitional dynamics.
- Capital used in two sectors, but only one *type* of capital, frictionlessly allocated between sectors \Rightarrow can jump straight to balanced growth path.

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Balanced Growth Path

- Let consumption goods be the numeraire, $p_C(t) = 1$.
- Look for balanced growth path with constant growth rates g_C, g_K etc and constant allocation x between sectors.
- Then from relative price condition, given x constant

$$\frac{\dot{p}_I(t)}{p_I(t)} = -(1-\alpha)g_K$$

• Hence from no-arbitrage condition

$$r_C(t) = \frac{r_I(t)}{p_I(t)} + \frac{\dot{p}_I(t)}{p_I(t)} = A - \delta - (1 - \alpha)g_K$$

• Hence from consumption Euler equation

$$g_C = \frac{A - \delta - (1 - \alpha)g_K - \rho}{\theta}$$

Balanced Growth Path

• Recall production function for consumption goods

$$C(t) = BK_C(t)^{\alpha} L_C(t)^{1-\alpha}, \qquad 0 < \alpha < 1$$

• So given that $L_C(t) = L$ constant and $K_C(t) = (1 - x)K(t)$ we have

$$g_C = \alpha g_K < g_K$$

• Hence solution is

$$g_K = \frac{A - \delta - \rho}{1 - \alpha + \alpha \theta}, \qquad g_C = \alpha \frac{A - \delta - \rho}{1 - \alpha + \alpha \theta}$$

• From the labor market condition, wage growth is given by

$$g_W = \alpha g_K = g_C$$

• From the production function for investment goods

$$g_I = g_K$$

Allocation of Capital Between Sectors

- What pins down share x of capital in the investment goods sector?
- From accumulation technology

$$\frac{\dot{K}(t)}{K(t)} = \frac{I(t)}{K(t)} - \delta = Ax - \delta$$

• Hence along a balanced growth path

$$x = \frac{g_K + \delta}{A} = \frac{A - \rho - \alpha(1 - \theta)\delta}{A(1 - \alpha(1 - \theta))}$$

• Assumptions^{*}. Now we need

(i) $A > \rho + \delta$, so economy is growing, $g_K, g_C > 0$ [same as in one-sector model] (ii) $\rho > (1 - \theta)\alpha(A - \delta)$, so TVC is satisfied [and x < 1]

Aggregate Expenditure

• Real aggregate expenditure/income in units of consumption

$$Y(t) = C(t) + p_I(t)I(t)$$

or

$$\frac{\dot{Y}(t)}{Y(t)} = \frac{C(t)}{Y(t)}\frac{\dot{C}(t)}{C(t)} + \frac{p_I(t)I(t)}{Y(t)}\left(\frac{\dot{p}_I(t)}{p_I(t)} + \frac{\dot{I}(t)}{I(t)}\right)$$

• So along a balanced growth path

$$g_Y = \frac{C(t)}{Y(t)}g_C + \frac{p_I(t)I(t)}{Y(t)}(-(1-\alpha)g_K + g_I)$$

$$= \frac{C(t)}{Y(t)} \alpha g_K + \left(1 - \frac{C(t)}{Y(t)}\right) \alpha g_K$$

$$= \alpha g_K = g_C$$

Discussion

- Unlike standard neoclassical growth model, there is continuous capital deepening, K(t)/L grows without bound.
- Diminishing returns to capital in production, but linear accumulation.
- Physical capital K(t) grows faster than Y(t), which may seem in tension with constant 'capital/output' ratio.
- But in two-sector model K(t) and Y(t) have different units.
- Relative price of investment falls at just the right rate to keep expenditure share $p_I(t)I(t)/Y(t)$ constant.

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3. Growth with externalities

Externalities in capital accumulation Planning problem

Growth With Externalities

- Romer (1986) model of 'knowledge accumulation'.
- How to do knowledge accumulation in a competitive economy?
- Key idea: Marshallian *external economies*
 - knowledge accumulation *unintentional byproduct* of capital accumulation
 - a form of technological spillovers, simply 'in the air'
 - captures key idea that knowledge is largely *non-rival*
 - in short, positive externalities in capital accumulation
- Do this in one-sector model. Capital and output measured in same units.

Setup

- Constant labor force L > 0 with n = 0 [but now this is important].
- Continuum $i \in [0, 1]$ of identical firms each with production function

$$Y_i(t) = F(K_i(t), A(t)L_i(t))$$

• Factor market clearing

$$\int_0^1 K_i(t) \, di = K(t)$$
$$\int_0^1 L_i(t) \, di = L$$

• All firms have productivity A(t). Hence all firms choose the same capital/labor ratio $K_i(t)/L_i(t) = K(t)/L(t)$ with factor prices

$$R(t) = F_K(K_i(t), A(t)L_i(t)) = F_K(K(t), A(t)L)$$
$$w(t) = F_L(K_i(t), A(t)L_i(t))A(t) = F_L(K(t), A(t)L)A(t)$$

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Externalities in Capital Accumulation

- Key assumption. Each individual firm takes A(t) as given but A(t) is endogenous to aggregate K(t).
- Economy-wide capital accumulation generates A(t) as unintentional byproduct. No resources used, no payments to knowledge per se.
- Extreme version of such externalities

$$A(t) = BK(t), \qquad B > 0$$

• Implies aggregate technology is linear in aggregate capital

$$Y(t) = F(K(t), BK(t)L) = f(L)K(t), \qquad f(L) \equiv F(1, BL)$$

• REMARKS. A bit like 'learning-by-doing' but at the aggregate level. Lucas (1988) is similar, but externalities though human capital.

Externalities in Capital Accumulation

- A *competitive equilibrium* is a system of prices and quantities such that:
 - (i) the representative household maximizes utility, taking prices as given
 - (ii) the representative firm maximizes profits, taking prices as given
 - (iii) markets clear, in particular

$$a(t) = k(t)$$

- The competitive equilibrium here is generally *inefficient*, benefits from knowledge accumulation are not *internalized*.
- Factor prices satisfy

$$R(t) = F_K(K(t), A(t)L) = F_K(1, BL)$$
$$w(t) = F_L(K(t), A(t)L)A(t) = F_L(1, BL)BK(t)$$

Discussion

• Aggregate technology

$$Y(t) = f(L)K(t)$$

• But in equilibrium factor prices are

$$R(t) = F_K(1, BL) = [f(L) - f'(L)L] \le f(L)$$

and

$$w(t) = F_L(1, BL)BK(t) = f'(L)K(t)$$

- Externality from capital accumulation to productivity is 'not priced'.
- Rental rate constant R = f(L) f'(L)L, real interest rate $r = R \delta$.

Equilibrium Growth

• From consumption Euler equation, growth is

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = \frac{r-\rho}{\theta} = \frac{f(L) - f'(L)L - \delta - \rho}{\theta} \equiv g$$

• From flow budget constraint, evaluated at equilibrium factor prices

$$\dot{k}(t) = rk(t) + w(t) - c(t) = (\underbrace{f(L) - \delta}_{\geq r})k(t) - c(t)$$

• Solution is again given by a constant policy function

$$c(t) = (f(L) - \delta - g)k(t)$$

• Assumptions^{*}. Now we need

(i) $f(L) - f'(L)L > \rho + \delta$, so economy is growing, g > 0(ii) $\rho > (1 - \theta)(f(L) - f'(L)L - \delta)$, so TVC is satisfied, r > g [note n = 0]

• REMARK. If r > g then policy function is increasing in k.

Scale Effects Problem

• Need n = 0 because of the scale effects problem. Write growth

$$g = \frac{f(L) - f'(L)L - \delta - \rho}{\theta}$$

- Implies larger economies, as measured by L, grow faster [f''(L) < 0].
- With n > 0, growth rate g increases as L increases, perpetual acceleration.
- Capital accumulation so rapid transversality condition cannot be satisfied.
- Partly a consequence of strong form of capital externalities, we will see how to mitigate this next class.

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Planning Problem

- Given externality, not surprising competitive equilibrium is inefficient.
- What then is the efficient allocation? Planner maximizes

$$U = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \left(\frac{c(t)^{1-\theta} - 1}{1-\theta}\right) dt$$

subject to the flow resource constraint, internalizing knowledge spillovers

$$\dot{k}(t) = (f(L) - \delta)k(t) - c(t)$$

• Incentives to accumulate capital driven by the social return $f(L) - \delta$ which is larger than the private return $r = f(L) - f'(L)L - \delta$.

Planning Problem

• From Planner's consumption Euler equation

$$g^* = \frac{f(L) - \delta - \rho}{\theta} > \frac{f(L) - f'(L)L - \delta - \rho}{\theta} = g$$

- Planner internalizes effect of capital accumulation on productivity, so accumulates capital at faster rate than in decentralized equilibrium.
- Acknowledging higher social return to capital, planner chooses higher saving rate, trading off lower initial consumption for higher lifetime utility.

Summary

- Linearity, mostly clearly visible in Ak model, drives results
 - makes sustained growth possible, by violating Inada conditions
 - simplifies solution, eliminating transitional dynamics
- Important tension
 - standard parameterizations of neoclassical growth models make it *hard* to generate large cross-country differences in output per worker
 - linear growth models make it *too easy* to to generate large cross-country differences in output per worker
 - implicit 'each country is an island' interpretation seems particularly unattractive when thinking about knowledge spillovers

Next Class

- Endogenous growth as a consequence of deliberate investment in R&D.
- Further implications of economies of scale.
- Departing from perfect competition.

Homework

• Consider the decentralized equilibrium of the Romer (1986) model with production function

$$Y = K^{\alpha} (AL)^{1-\alpha}$$

- Now suppose that capital accumulation is *subsidized* at a constant rate τ funded by lump-sum taxes.
- Check. Show that the subsidy rate τ that implements the planner's solution is given by

$$1 + \tau = \frac{1}{\alpha}$$

• CHECK YOUR INTUITION. Why is the subsidy rate decreasing in α ?