

Macroeconomics Tutorial #5: Solutions

1. **Asset pricing with log utility.** Suppose there is a durable asset that pays dividends y_t that follow a Markov chain with transition probabilities $\pi(y' | y) = \text{Prob}[y_{t+1} = y' | y_t = y]$. At the beginning of period t the representative consumer's holdings of this asset are k_t and they choose how many units of this asset to hold for the next period k_{t+1} . Their initial endowment of the asset is normalized to $k_0 = 1$. The price of this asset is p_t and is taken as given. The representative consumer seeks to maximize

$$\mathbb{E} \left\{ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \log(c_t) \right\}, \quad 0 < \beta < 1 \quad (1)$$

subject to the budget constraints

$$c_t + p_t k_{t+1} \leq (p_t + y_t) k_t$$

along with $c_t \geq 0$ and $k_{t+1} \geq 0$.

- (a) Let $v(k, y)$ denote the representative consumer's value function. Setup the representative consumer's dynamic programming problem in terms of this value function and define a recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy.
- (b) Let $p(y)$ denote the price of the asset when the current dividend state is y . Show that in equilibrium $p(y)$ solves the functional equation

$$p(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} \frac{y}{y'} [p(y') + y'] \pi(y' | y) \quad (2)$$

- (c) Let $f(y) = p(y)/y$ so that $f(y)$ solves the functional equation

$$f(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} (f(y') + 1) \pi(y' | y)$$

Let T denote the operator on the RHS of this equation

$$Tf(y) \equiv \beta \sum_{y'} (f(y') + 1) \pi(y' | y)$$

Show that T satisfies Blackwell's sufficient conditions for a contraction mapping.

- (d) Solve the functional equation (2) for $p(y)$.

SOLUTIONS:

(a) Taking $p(y)$ as given, the Bellman equation for the representative consumer can be written

$$v(k, y) = \max_{k' \geq 0} \left[\log((p(y) + y)k - p(y)k') + \beta \sum_{y'} v(k', y') \pi(y' | y) \right]$$

Let $k' = g(k, y)$ denote the optimal policy that achieves the maximum on the RHS of the Bellman equation. A *recursive competitive equilibrium* is three functions, $v(k, y)$, $g(k, y)$ and $p(y)$ such that (i) taking $p(y)$ as given $v(k, y)$ and $g(k, y)$ solve the representative consumer's dynamic programming problem, and (ii) the asset market clears, $g(k, y) = 1$ for all k, y . If the asset market clears, then so does the goods market, so that $c = y$.

(b) The first order condition for k' can be written

$$\frac{1}{c} p(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} v_1(k', y') \pi(y' | y)$$

where it is understood that c is evaluated at the optimum and where $v_1(k, y)$ denotes the derivate of the value function with respect to its first argument. Using the optimal policy $g(k, y)$ we can write

$$v(k, y) = \log((p(y) + y)k - p(y)g(k, y)) + \beta \sum_{y'} v(g(k, y), y') \pi(y' | y)$$

Hence applying the envelope theorem gives

$$v_1(k, y) = \frac{1}{c} (p(y) + y)$$

so that

$$v_1(k', y') = \frac{1}{c'} (p(y') + y')$$

Using this expression to eliminate $v_1(k', y')$ from the first order condition gives

$$\frac{1}{c} p(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} \frac{1}{c'} (p(y') + y') \pi(y' | y)$$

Multiplying both sides by c and using $c = y$ then gives the equilibrium asset pricing equation

$$p(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} \frac{y}{y'} (p(y') + y') \pi(y' | y)$$

(c) Blackwell's sufficient conditions require (i), that the operator is monotone, in the sense that if $f_1 \geq f_2$ then $Tf_1 \geq Tf_2$, and (ii) that the operator satisfies the discounting property, $T(f + a) \leq Tf + \beta a$ for some $\beta \in (0, 1)$. To see (i), suppose that $f_1 \geq f_2$. Then

$$Tf_1(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} (f_1(y') + 1) \pi(y' | y)$$

and

$$Tf_2(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} (f_2(y') + 1) \pi(y' | y)$$

So that

$$Tf_1(y) - Tf_2(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} (f_1(y') - f_2(y')) \pi(y' | y) \geq 0$$

Hence indeed

$$Tf_1(y) \geq Tf_2(y)$$

To see (ii), observe

$$\begin{aligned} T(f+a)(y) &= \beta \sum_{y'} (f(y') + a + 1) \pi(y' | y) \\ &= \beta \sum_{y'} (f(y') + 1) \pi(y' | y) + \beta \sum_{y'} a \pi(y' | y) \\ &= Tf(y) + \beta a \sum_{y'} \pi(y' | y) \\ &= Tf(y) + \beta a \end{aligned}$$

since for each y the sum of transition probabilities is $\sum_{y'} \pi(y' | y) = 1$. Hence T also satisfies the discounting property. Since (i) and (ii) are satisfied, T is a contraction mapping.

- (d) Guess that the functional equation $f = Tf$ is solved by a constant function $f(y) = a$ for all y . Such a constant satisfies

$$a = \beta \sum_{y'} (a + 1) \pi(y' | y) = \beta(a + 1)$$

Hence

$$a = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta}$$

Since $f(y) = a$ and $p(y) = f(y)y$, the solution to (2) is

$$p(y) = \frac{\beta}{1 - \beta} y$$

- 2. Asset pricing with CRRA utility and IID dividends.** Now suppose that the period utility function in (1) is the more general CRRA specification

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\alpha} - 1}{1-\alpha}, \quad \alpha > 0$$

and that dividends are IID over time so that $\pi(y' | y) = \pi(y')$ independent of the current y . Show that in equilibrium $p(y)$ now solves the functional equation

$$p(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} \left(\frac{y'}{y} \right)^{-\alpha} (p(y') + y') \pi(y') \quad (3)$$

Solve the functional equation (3) for $p(y)$. Other things equal, are asset prices higher or lower when the representative consumer is more risk averse? Give as much intuition as you can.

SOLUTION:

With this more general CRRA specification the representative consumer's first order condition for k' can be written

$$c^{-\alpha} p(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} v_1(k', y') \pi(y' | y)$$

where it is understood that c is evaluated at the optimum. Applying the envelope theorem gives

$$v_1(k, y) = c^{-\alpha} (p(y) + y)$$

Using this expression to eliminate $v_1(k', y')$ from the first order condition gives

$$c^{-\alpha} p(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} c'^{-\alpha} (p(y') + y') \pi(y' | y)$$

Multiplying both sides by c^α and using $c = y$ then gives the equilibrium asset pricing equation

$$p(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} \left(\frac{y'}{y} \right)^{-\alpha} (p(y') + y') \pi(y' | y)$$

In the further special case that y' is IID so that $\pi(y' | y) = \pi(y')$ for all y we have

$$p(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} \left(\frac{y'}{y} \right)^{-\alpha} (p(y') + y') \pi(y')$$

To solve this functional equation, let $f(y) = p(y)/y^\alpha$ so that

$$f(y) = \beta \sum_{y'} (f(y') + y'^{1-\alpha}) \pi(y')$$

Now guess that this functional equation is solved by a constant function $f(y) = a$ for all y . Such a constant satisfies

$$a = \beta \sum_{y'} (a + y'^{1-\alpha}) \pi(y') = \beta a + \beta \delta$$

where

$$\delta \equiv \sum_{y'} y'^{1-\alpha} \pi(y') = \mathbb{E}\{y^{1-\alpha}\}$$

Hence

$$a = \frac{\beta \delta}{1 - \beta}$$

Since $f(y) = a$ and $p(y) = f(y)y^\alpha$, the solution is

$$p(y) = \frac{\beta \delta}{1 - \beta} y^\alpha, \quad \delta = \mathbb{E}\{y^{1-\alpha}\}$$

Notice that in the log utility case, $\alpha = 1$, we have $\delta = 1$ so this agrees with our calculation in question 1 above (which, however, did not impose that dividends are IID).